segunda-feira, 11 de novembro de 2013

FMI sugere imposto único sobre os depósitos bancários

Aquilo que muitos garantiram ser irreal e que só se aplicaria ao Chipre, parece estar agora mais próximo da realidade. O Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), que, tal como as organizações internacionais, em geral, não paga qualquer imposto e depende das contribuições dos Estados, equaciona, num documento de Outubro de 2013, ainda que de forma excepcional, o confisco de depósitos bancários dos particulares por via daquilo a que chama de «imposto único sobre a riqueza privada» (one-off tax on private wealth) como forma de financiar resgates aos países que necessitem de ajuda financeira. O estudo do FMI chega mesmo a sugerir um valor para países da Zona Euro (10%) sem estabelecer limites mínimos - ou seja, cai a famosa teoria de que depósitos até 100 mil euros estão protegidos. E aponta precedentes como forma de legitimar uma medida desta natureza. Passo a transcrever a reflexão do FMI:

«“The sharp deterioration of the public finances in  many countries has revived interest in a “capital levy” - a one-off tax on private wealth - as an exceptional  measure to restore debt sustainability. The appeal is that such a tax, if it is implemented before avoidance is possible and there is a belief that it will never be repeated, does not distort behavior (and may be seen by some as fair). There have been illustrious supporters, including Pigou, Ricardo, Schumpeter, and - until he changed his mind - Keynes. The conditions for success  are strong, but also need to be weighed against the risks  of the alternatives, which include repudiating public  debt or inflating it away (these, in turn, are a particular form of wealth tax - on bondholders - that also falls on nonresidents). 
There is a surprisingly large amount of experience to draw on, as such levies were widely adopted in Europe after World War I and in Germany and Japan after World War II. Reviewed in Eichengreen (1990), this experience suggests that more notable than any loss of credibility was a simple failure to achieve debt reduction, largely because the delay in introduction gave space for extensive avoidance and capital flight - in turn spurring inflation.  
The tax rates needed to bring down public debt to precrisis levels, moreover, are sizable: reducing debt ratios to end-2007 levels would require (for a sample of 15 euro area countries) a tax rate of about 10 percent on households with positive net wealth.”»

Com a banca portuguesa em constante perigo e com necessidade de se recapitalizar e com Portugal à beira de um 2.º resgate, seremos nós o próximo Chipre?

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